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Abstract
In principle, intellectual property protections (IPPs) promote and protect
important but costly investment in research and development. However, the
empirical reality of IPPs has often gone without critical evaluation, and the
potential of alternative approaches to lend equal or greater support for useful
innovation is rarely considered. In this paper, we review the mounting evidence
that the global intellectual property regime (IPR) for germplasm has been
neither necessary nor sufficient to generate socially beneficial improvements in
crop plants and maintain agrobiodiversity. Instead, based on our analysis, the
dominant global IPR appears to have contributed to consolidation in the seed
industry while failing to genuinely engage with the potential of alternatives to
support social goods such as food security, adaptability, and resilience. The
dominant IPR also constrains collaborative and cumulative plant breeding
processes that are built upon the work of countless farmers past and present.
Given the likely limits of current IPR, we propose that social goods in agriculture
may be better supported by alternative approaches, warranting a rapid move
away from the dominant single-dimensional focus on encouraging innovation
through ensuring monopoly profits to IPP holders.
 
This article is included in the Open knowledge in
 channel.agricultural development
 This article is included in the   channel.GODAN
1,2
1
2
3
     Referee Status:
  Invited Referees
 version 1
published
17 Mar 2017
   1 2 3
report report report
, University ofSheryl D. Breen
Minnesota Morris USA
1
, University ofWilliam F. Tracy
Wisconsin–Madison USA
2
, Northumbria University UKSue Farran3
 17 Mar 2017,  :284 (doi:  )First published: 6 10.12688/f1000research.10497.1
 17 Mar 2017,  :284 (doi:  )Latest published: 6 10.12688/f1000research.10497.1
v1
Page 1 of 15
F1000Research 2017, 6:284 Last updated: 27 APR 2017
  M. Jahi Chappell ( )Corresponding author: mjahi@umich.edu
 Halpert MT and Chappell MJ. How to cite this article:  reasons to question enclosed intellectual property regimes and favorPrima facie
   2017,  :284 (doi: open-source regimes for germplasm [version 1; referees: 2 approved, 1 approved with reservations] F1000Research 6
)10.12688/f1000research.10497.1
 © 2017 Halpert MT and Chappell MJ. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Copyright: Creative Commons Attribution
, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Data associatedLicence
with the article are available under the terms of the   (CC0 1.0 Public domain dedication).Creative Commons Zero "No rights reserved" data waiver
 The author(s) declared that no grants were involved in supporting this work.Grant information:
 Competing interests: MJC sits on the Board of Directors of the Open Source Seed Initiative (OSSI). At the time of the conception and initial
drafting of this paper, MJC and MH both worked for the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP). IATP helped found OSSI and is a partner
organization. The work here reflects the analysis performed by MH and MJC, and does not necessarily reflect the views of OSSI or IATP.
 17 Mar 2017,  :284 (doi:  ) First published: 6 10.12688/f1000research.10497.1
Page 2 of 15
F1000Research 2017, 6:284 Last updated: 27 APR 2017
Introduction
Given the challenges of sustainably providing food security for the 
present and future human population, it is often asserted that large-
scale, technology-intensive agricultural innovation is necessary 
now, more than ever (Beddington, 2010; Monsanto, 2015). Indeed, 
there seems to be near consensus, from corporations to social move-
ments, that “business as usual is not an option” (IAASTD, 2009; 
Joubert, 2016; Unilever, 2016). This sense of urgency is embraced 
by many agrifood corporations, who often put forward their prod-
ucts and services as key contributions to help society innovate into 
a better future. Leaving aside the flaws in this framing of the chal-
lenges facing us (see e.g., Lappé & Collins, 2015), large multi-
national agricultural corporations are, in a certain sense, uniquely 
placed to lead in this innovation process: they increasingly domi-
nate all aspects of the food system, including seeds (Howard, 2016). 
Further, within the area of agricultural inputs, these corporations 
have been able to assure their continued prominence through the 
dominant intellectual property regime (IPR), particularly patents on 
seeds. Whether the approaches to IPR embraced by such actors is to 
the (public) good in the face of today’s large-scale problems is the 
topic of this paper.
The underlying claim made (especially, but not solely) by large 
agricultural corporations in support of intellectual property pro-
tections (IPP) is that “locking up” innovations behind patents is a 
necessary mechanism to ensure continued innovation. The ex post 
(“after-the-fact”) inefficiency that occurs when IPPs prevent other 
innovators from building on new technologies is widely recog-
nized, but is considered part of a “profitable bargain for society” 
(Moschini, 2010). The argument goes that in an area that involves 
high research costs, the net social good of innovations spurred by 
the potential monopoly protection of patents is greater than what is 
lost due to patents’ restrictions.
This logic is widespread and broadly accepted, and recent decades 
have seen an increase in the importance of IPPs in shaping seed 
systems around the world, particularly in the U.S. (Kloppenburg, 
2004; Luby & Goldman, 2016). Given the challenges of provid-
ing both food security and environmental sustainability in agricul-
ture, agricultural corporations argue that innovation—and therefore 
patents—will only become more important yet.
But what if patents pose more of an impediment than an aid to 
addressing current challenges? The actual balance of costs and 
benefits realized from intellectual property typically goes unques-
tioned. So it is possible, prima facie, that patents and similar ele-
ments of dominant global IP systems are unnecessary, and perhaps 
even inimical, to the development of socially-beneficial innovations 
in agriculture. Furthermore, alternative approaches may be equally 
or better able to support innovation through mechanisms that 
decrease or eliminate the ex post inefficiency (Cimoli et al., 2014). 
This paper explores these ideas, specifically with reference to germ-
plasm, based on an analysis of existing and theoretical dynamics in 
agriculture and innovation.
Intellectual property protections for plants in the U.S. 
and in international agreements
Since the 1960s, a jumble of international governing organizations 
have attempted to regulate IPPs for plant genetic resources. Dur-
ing this time, significant pressure by individual governments and 
international institutions has been exerted to adopt what could be 
called a “global IPR”, which has been “developed principally in 
the Western legal context… principally a U.S. utilitarian approach” 
(Forsyth, 2016; see also Henry & Stiglitz, 2010).
The “utilitarian” innovation system of the U.S. is based on an 
approach whereby ideas and materials are putatively owned by indi-
vidual entities, excluding all others from using such “intellectual 
property” without permission. Within this approach, three primary 
forms of IPP governing plants and plant genetic resources have 
been developed over the past century: plant patents; Plant Variety 
Protection certificates; and utility patents.
The 1930 Plant Patent Act allowed breeders to patent plant varieties 
that reproduce asexually (i.e., without seeds), protecting putative 
owners of IP while sidestepping controversies around seed saving 
practices (Heald & Chapman, 2011). Starting from 1970, sexu-
ally reproduced plants were also “protected” through Plant Variety 
Protection (PVP), providing that the varieties could be determined 
to be novel, distinct, and uniform. PVP certificates included two 
important exceptions: a breeders’ exception allowing the use of pro-
tected varieties for non-commercial research and the development 
of varieties not essentially derived from the protected variety; and a 
farmers’ exception allowing seed saving for personal use (Heald & 
Chapman, 2011; Pardey et al., 2013). The third form of IPP in the 
U.S. has its origin in the 1980 U.S. Supreme Court case Diamond 
vs. Chakrabarty. This case (and subsequent rulings) asserted that 
utility patents were applicable to plant varieties, and even genetic 
sequences in certain cases (Van Dooren, 2008). Unlike PVPs, the 
extension of utility patenting to plant and genetic materials involved 
no exceptions for seed saving, research, or other breeding activities. 
Certain forms of “dual protection” are also possible, combining 
different kinds of patents, or a PVP certificate and a utility pat-
ent (Pardey et al., 2013). Additionally, large commercial breeders 
have made use of contracts, laws protecting trade secrets, intra- 
industry-regulation and enforcement (“private ordering”) to exclude 
others from accessing their innovations (Butruille et al., 2015), 
and to reinforce formal modes of IPP. In some cases this has made 
IPP restrictions significantly more severe (Elkin-Koren, 2005; 
Kloppenburg, 2014).
Many policies at the international level have paralleled the U.S.’s 
trajectory. For example, the International Union for the Protection 
of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) establishes requirements that 
varieties to be protected are novel, distinct, uniform, and stable. 
While it had included farmers’ and breeders’ exceptions similar 
to that of PVPs, the most recent version of the agreement made 
these exceptions optional (Salazar et al., 2007; Van Dooren, 2008). 
Meanwhile, the World Trade Organization requires all member 
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nations to have some form of IPP for plants through the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
Under TRIPS, countries technically have the option to develop their 
own IPP systems, which could potentially support alternatives to 
the dominant global IPR (Kloppenburg, 2010). However, in prac-
tice most countries simply adopt restrictions descending from the 
U.S./Western approach.
At times, however, international agreements have included 
approaches differing from this pattern. Some agreements have 
attempted to regulate plant genetic resources as common heritage, 
to address the uneven flow of germplasm from “developing” coun-
tries to “developed” ones, and to account for the crucial historical 
and continuing contributions of countless farmers to plant breeding 
(Aoki, 2009). While these attempts are useful for suggesting alter-
natives to protecting and supporting innovation, they have so far 
had relatively little impact, and have been significantly constrained 
by the dominant global IPR. For example, the International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR) 
established a system in which recipients of germplasm from 
international seed banks cannot patent any of the seeds they receive 
from these banks (Aoki, 2009). However, patenting germplasm 
or genetic materials that are subsequently derived from such mul-
tilateral system seeds or particular genes or DNA is allowed under 
the treaty (ibid.). This means that there is a still the opportunity for 
patenting entities to benefit from common heritage while refusing 
to share subsequent benefits (Vogel et al., 2011).
Draining the pool of knowledge: Enclosing more than 
giving back
While the necessity and effectiveness of IPPs, and patents in par-
ticular, are often assumed, some researchers have begun to examine 
the quality of these claims, especially in the context of germplasm. 
The pertinent question is essentially whether IPPs may limit future 
innovation more than they contribute to it. And patents, in particu-
lar, have been heavily scrutinized from this point of view. By grant-
ing exclusive rights of ownership to the patent holder, they are one 
of the most restrictive approaches to IPP, essentially allowing the 
owner to set the price for others to use their IP at infinity (Stiglitz, 
2014). Thus, 
• “What seem to be more important [than strong IPRs] are 
the ‘opportunities,’ the potential for discoveries, related 
to the pool of knowledge to be exploited…
• …Patents inevitably enclose what would otherwise have 
been in the public domain. In doing so, not only do they 
impede the efficient use of knowledge, but because 
knowledge itself is the most important input into the 
production of further knowledge (innovations), they may 
even impede the flow of innovations,” (Stiglitz, 2014).
Under Stiglitz’s models using “plausible conditions,” the incentives 
to innovation provided by patents encourages innovation initially, 
but ultimately does not sufficiently replace what it removes, stifling 
further innovation. This effect, combined with a possible underuse 
of existing innovations resulting from IPPs, is a dynamic that has 
been identified in biomedical research as the “anti-commons,” by 
Heller & Eisenberg (1998). In an anti-commons, “more intellectual 
property rights may lead paradoxically to fewer useful products for 
improving human health.” While Heller and Eisenberg clarify that 
they are not speaking about the “routine underuse” of innovations 
that occurs under patents, their description of an anti-commons 
appears to fit the results of Stiglitz’s model as well.
Given that agroecosystems span a wide range of cultural and envi-
ronmental conditions and affect a wide variety of needs and impacts 
(from food security to their effects on wild biodiversity to climate 
change impacts), it would seem appropriate to have an innovation 
system that encourages greater accessibility to knowledge for a 
diversity of approaches and actors. Yet the current IPR appears to 
have contributed to the neglect of certain approaches to agricul-
ture and plant breeding and contributed to a dearth of plant breed-
ing PhDs (Goodman, 2002; Vanloqueren & Baret, 2009). Further, 
Vanloqueren and Baret point out that practices like agroforestry 
that provide a number of public goods (e.g. sustainable livelihoods, 
resilience, and environmental quality) are based on system-level 
practices that are not patentable, and generate benefits over a long 
time period, two characteristics that strongly limit the pertinence of 
IPPs for boosting innovation. Such dynamics should be an object 
of concern; robust innovation systems ought to grant appropriate 
consideration to the full scope of ideas that could be socially useful 
(van den Hove et al., 2012).
To give a brief practical example of the dynamics at hand, one study 
of genetic diversity in pearl millet cultivars in India demonstrated 
that farmer social and management practices helped to maintain 
diversity and variation among local landraces, which “possess 
superior nutritional quality as well as higher fodder yield under 
severe conditions,” (vom Brocke et al., 2003). This is consistent 
with numerous studies showing that maintenance of agrobiodiver-
sity can significantly contribute to sustainable farmer livelihoods, 
resilience, and adaptability (Chappell et al., 2013). But despite 
these useful properties, the diversity within landraces means they 
are generally not distinct, uniform, and stable, as would be required 
for protection under global IPR (Salazar et al., 2007). Further, 
the restrictions of typical IPPs means farmers would not be able 
to legally treat protected varieties “as raw material for direct use 
and further improvement [which] is still the norm in many parts of 
the world” (ibid). Between this and the requirements of uniform-
ity, distinctiveness, and stability, the dominant global IPR often 
exerts pressure to decrease diversity, and thus limit the usefulness 
and adaptability of our future seed supply—taking more out of the 
collective “pool of knowledge” than the IPPs put back.
These dynamics represent the dangers of enclosing knowledge, 
but we have not yet covered the evidence as to how much IPPs 
do incentivize further innovation, that is to say, what IPPs give 
back to the pool of knowledge. On the one hand, drawing from 
case studies in the Pacific Islands region, Forsyth & Farran (2013) 
observed that “a Western IP system deflects attention from the need 
to support the organisations actually generating agricultural inno-
vation in the region” (where breeding funding comes primarily 
from the public sector and NGOs who are not seeking patent-based 
returns on investment). Further, the dominant Western IPR may 
undermine traditions of benefit sharing and “undermine regional 
initiatives to promote food security through the sharing of plant 
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genetic resources” (Forsyth & Farran, 2013). In the cases they 
examined (and by analogy, they argue, many other “less devel-
oped countries”), prioritization of food security has generally been 
associated with supporting diversity, autonomy, and protection of 
farmers’ access to seeds within alternative and traditional networks, 
while approaches focusing on global IPR have often accompanied 
a trade-oriented mentality that does not truly address the needs 
and particularities of local communities (Forsyth & Farran, 2013; 
see similar conclusions based on research in other “less developed 
countries” in Chappell et al., 2013; McKeon, 2015).
However, in contrast to areas where the public sector dominates 
funding for plant breeding, IPPs should theoretically be responsi-
ble for significant outputs of research systems where plant breeding 
research is largely funded by private companies, as it is in the U.S. 
Heald & Chapman (2011) examined this hypothesis in one of the 
most extensive empirical analyses of IPPs to date. The authors stud-
ied the relationships between diversity, PVPs, patents, and com-
mercially available varieties for apples and 42 vegetables over the 
period of 1903–2004. While a substantial number of new varieties 
were commercialized during this timeframe (which they took to 
represent innovation), only 3.8% of varieties commercially avail-
able in 2004 (excluding corn) were ever subject to patents, and only 
16% of patented varieties were ever commercialized, suggesting a 
weak connection between IPPs and innovation in this area of breed-
ing. In other words, most of the innovation in these plants was pro-
duced independently from IPP incentives. It should be noted that in 
the case of corn, patenting activity was much more prominent and 
patented seeds were prevalent in the market. But Heald and Chapman 
assessed that patents in corn may represent rent-seeking more 
than protection for innovation. That is, patents in corn may serve 
to exclude others from accessing “protected” germplasm without 
supporting any further innovation (Heald & Chapman, 2011).
Even if this is the case, Western-style IPP might still be justified if 
rent-seeking owners use what they have withdrawn from the pool 
of knowledge to produce even higher-quality innovations than they 
would have otherwise produced. That is, the “monopoly rent” they 
extract from patents on, say, corn varieties may not spur them to 
innovate by creating more varieties, but it is possible that they use 
their profits to come up with higher quality varieties. However, in 
the case of plant breeding, there are reasons to doubt that extremely 
high-cost patented research is worthwhile in this manner, either. For 
example, research on seed prices has demonstrated that transgenic 
traits in commercialized seed are overpriced with regard to the rel-
ative research costs and yield gains provided to farmers through 
conventional breeding (Goodman, 2002; Moss, 2013). In this case, 
IPPs may simply be enabling companies to charge prices for their 
IP that are actually greater than the benefits they produce (Moss, 
2013). A second, if tentative, line of evidence that patents may not 
be driving innovation of significantly superior varieties comes from 
a study by Bulte et al. (2014). Their analysis of randomized control 
and double-blind trials in Tanzania found that differences in yield 
between modern and traditional cowpea varieties were wholly due 
to differences in farmers’ management practices based on perceived 
differences in the varieties (as harvests were the same for farmers 
who received modern varieties and those who did know which type 
of seed they got). While this was only one study, and its results 
cannot be extrapolated to all modern seeds (or specifically those 
under IPPs), a comprehensive review by Loevinsohn et al. (2013) 
implies that the literature evaluating agricultural innovation is 
rife with similar challenges to scientific validity: they screened 
over 20,000 studies, and came up with only 5 that met reasonable 
standards of rigor (e.g., that would be capable of eliminating the 
confounding effects found by Bulte et al.).
In short, there is a significant lack of rigorous evidence that IPPs 
have led to the kind of higher-quality innovation that would jus-
tify their restrictions, much less sufficient evidence to establish that 
IPPs are decisively “giving back” more than they are taking from 
the collective pool of knowledge.
Further considerations challenging contemporary 
dominant IPR
Beyond the dynamics related to the “pool of knowledge,” other fac-
tors may limit the appropriateness of global IPR for plant genetic 
resources: the connections between agriculture, plant breeding, 
and a number of other public goods. For example, with regards 
to “essential facilities”—resources that have no substitute and are 
fundamentally necessary for further innovation to occur—Henry & 
Stiglitz (2010) argue that no broad patents, and possibly, no patents 
at all should be granted. They give the specific example of geneti-
cally modified foods (e.g., crops), and cite Harhoff et al.’s (2001) 
conclusion that patents in this area may not only not be necessary 
to innovation, but may hold back socially useful applications. Even 
those who strongly defend the use of IPPs for seeds point out at the 
same time that society at large benefits from broad access to plant 
genetic resources and the ability to save seeds (Scalise & Nugent, 
1995). The problem with broad access, according to Scalise and 
Nugent, is that society’s benefits come at the cost of inventors, and 
therefore, society will see fewer important innovations by inventors 
and miss out on new technologies that will help feed everyone and 
improve general welfare. Beyond the challenges to this claim that 
we have already addressed, it is important to re-emphasize the large 
uncertainties present in evaluating the benefits of supposed innova-
tions in plant breeding. That is: not only is the academic research on 
benefits of agricultural innovation lacking in rigorous and control-
led studies, but as Stone et al. (2014) point out farmer decisions in 
many cases may be dominated by social learning (emulation) and 
lead to a high degree of “faddism”. In their study, farmer adop-
tion of new varieties was dominated by cues taken from what other 
farmers were doing, and was not meaningfully related to the quali-
ties of each set of new seeds. This was not due to some deficiency 
on farmers’ part; they note that “yields and profits from any given 
seed are highly variable”, and “attributing… performance advan-
tages that have not been truly isolated from [their] confounding 
factors” is ubiquitous and long-standing throughout agriculture, 
echoing Loevinsohn et al.’s findings. The result is that it may, in 
practice, be impractical and unlikely that farmers will be able to 
decisively identify the benefits of innovations as quickly as private 
actors produce them, especially without the legal right to save and 
select seeds themselves, creating an information asymmetry ben-
efitting IPP holders at the cost of farmers. One might term it as 
a problem of a “market for persimmons,” where farmers cannot 
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quickly or easily distinguish the benefits of one seed versus another. 
(Various types of the persimmons fruit may appear similar, but need 
to be treated differently; cf. Akerlof (1970)).
Plant genetic resources are also tied to other public goods, such 
as biodiversity. For instance, agrobiodiversity affects the conserva-
tion of wild biodiversity (Chappell et al., 2013), and the loss of 
the former can negatively affect the latter. Therefore, if IPPs were 
leading to a loss of agrobiodiversity, that would be another argu-
ment against the dominant approach. Unfortunately, the degree of 
agrobiodiversity loss (or increase) over the past decades is diffi-
cult to measure and highly contended (Montenegro de Wit, 2015). 
However, the loss of small independent seed companies is more 
straightforward to measure, and would imply some levels of lost 
diversity given that larger, consolidated seed firms will have higher 
incentives to breed for a small amount of “elite” lines with “‘broad 
adaptability’ – the capacity of a plant to produce a high average 
yield over a wide range of growing environments and years… 
[while] varieties yielding well in one zone but less in another are 
quickly eliminated” (Desclaux et al., 2012). With regards to seed 
company consolidation and IPPs, not only have the applications for 
plant and utility patents and PVPs risen steeply since the 1980s 
and 90s, but the percentage of patents and PVPs held by the top 
applicants has also increased (Pardey et al., 2013). Farmers have 
increased their reliance on purchased rather than saved seed over 
the same time period as consolidation has increased dramatically 
(Howard, 2016; Marco & Rausser, 2008). In 2007, four companies 
(Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta and Groupe Limagrain) controlled 
more than half of the global proprietary seed market (ETC Group, 
2008). And all of them except Limagrain are currently part of pro-
spective mergers or buy-outs that would further increase consolida-
tion throughout the agricultural input chain (Purdy, 2016). Howard 
(2016) in fact states that “the seed industry is… nearing domination 
by just two firms”.
Many have expressed various concerns that such extreme concentra-
tion in this field has drawbacks for both food consumers and produc-
ers, depressing innovation and effectively allowing the industry to 
operate as an oligopolistic trust (Howard, 2016; Moss, 2013; Moss 
& Taylor, 2014). Such a high level of concentration also creates a 
paradox of collaboration. That is, cross-licensing traits theoretically 
makes IPP less exclusive. However, since the small number of large 
seed companies often only cross license with each other, this form 
of “collaboration” may threaten potential for innovation by reduc-
ing competition within this group and reinforcing the concentration 
of power in the industry (Howard, 2016; Moss, 2013). Indeed, in 
the case of germplasm, unlike other public goods, a depletion in 
current and future availability can be more related to a lack of use 
rather than overuse (Montenegro de Wit, 2015). In this way, the 
feedback between industry consolidation and the use restrictions 
represented by IPPs in germplasm should be worrisome.
Massively parallel computing? Peasant seed 
innovations vs. high technology centralization
As we have presented, contemporary global IPR has been tied to 
increased consolidation in germplasm research and commerciali-
zation, effectively centralizing a huge amount of resources for 
germplasm “innovation”. The centralizing tendencies of global IPR 
compared to various forms of decentralized breeding have different 
potential strengths. Centralization often offers greater precision in 
measuring results, but typically does so by eliminating environmen-
tal variance from its considerations, encouraging homogenization 
and limiting the actual applicability of its innovations to the large 
diversity of agricultural systems (Desclaux et al., 2012; Howard, 
2016). In contrast, decentralized selection may allow greater farmer 
participation and allow breeding efforts to provide closer matches 
between innovations and diverse local conditions. Several lines of 
research have suggested that this may be the case (Aistara, 2011; 
Desclaux et al., 2012). Decentralized in situ breeding further 
potentially allows crops to be exposed to their wild relatives, and 
thereby may incorporate diverse genetic material into the breeding 
pool (Jarvis & Hodgkin, 1999). While global IPR may in theory 
be compatible with this kind of in situ and decentralized efferts, 
in practice the very basis for these dynamics are restricted under 
dominant IPPs.
Another line of reasoning to prefer decentralized approaches reiter-
ates Scott’s (1998) classic observations on how centralizing forces 
often necessarily seek to reduce or marginalize vital complexi-
ties that otherwise allow local communities to function, innovate, 
or thrive. The idea that improved innovation and problem-solving 
may come from allowing great access and freedom to use genetic 
resources for many decentralized actors is also analogous to the 
rationales and results from Massively Parallel Computing (e.g., 
Barney, 2016) and crowdsourcing (e.g., Brabham, 2008). Although 
these systems are not perfectly analogous, a baseline idea may 
still apply: that many different centers of experimentation and 
knowledge may solve problems more quickly than concentrating 
resources among a smaller number of specialists. And alternative 
approaches, like Participatory Plant Breeding, represent the poten-
tial to combine strengths of decentralization and expert knowledge 
(Desclaux et al., 2012).
Further, decentralized approaches may be better equipped to deal 
with the complex relationship between the diversity of cultural 
practices, crop biodiversity, and the diversity of localized and 
alternative IPPs (Forsyth, 2016). Stability and distinctiveness 
requirements of current IPPs, as well as their emphasis on genetic 
factors above all else can pose obstacles to management strategies 
that produce valuable and adaptable, but “unstable”, cultivars. IPPs 
may also contribute to systematic failures in acknowledging, recog-
nizing, and respecting the importance of cultural and social prac-
tices around seeds, including the meaningful patterns of association 
between cultural diversity and biodiversity generated by localized 
factors (Desclaux et al., 2012; Montenegro de Wit, 2015).
Practically speaking, decentralized selection can occur in both 
formal and informal settings. If done well, formal participatory 
approaches can balance centralized organization and decentral-
ized selection, and can be more efficient (considering response to 
selection, adoption by farmers, and cost-benefit ratio) than conven-
tional plant breeding programs (Ceccarelli, 2015). Informal farmer 
breeding systems take a variety of forms, including highly collabo-
rative community-scale efforts. For example, some informal com-
munity breeding projects have involved a small number of farmers 
interested in performing earlier stage breeding work, with many 
farmers later selecting from advanced lines and providing the land 
necessary to grow them (Salazar et al., 2007).
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Bodies of theory on networks and innovation also suggest pos-
sible disadvantages to centralized systems (and thus, the current 
global IPR and concomitant increases in consolidation). Insofar 
as centralized systems represent increased connectivity between 
potential “nodes” of innovation or adaptation, they may resemble 
studies of connected populations and networks in economics and 
ecology. Findings in both of these fields reflect increased risks of 
systematic failures and large-scale collapse at high levels of con-
nectivity (Erola et al., 2012; He & Deem, 2010; Noble et al., 2015; 
Sensoy et al., 2013). Further, the significant power inequalities 
represented by centralized, consolidated systems may be directly 
inimical to innovation, if recent research is to be believed (Farrell 
& Shalizi, 2015; Page & Vandermeer, 2013).
The challenges and potential threats posed by the centralizing 
nature and unequal power relations present in many projects fea-
turing public funding or international collaboration bear contin-
ued scrutiny. Minimizing or even eliminating the current global 
IPR may be necessary to allow for the most productive forms of 
decentralization, which might be better-suited to develop effective 
localized solutions in this realm. At the same time, even a radical 
revamping of global IPR may be insufficient to challenge central-
izing and anti-egalitarian practices and structures, many of which 
operate on the assumption that centralization will result in desirable 
and worthwhile efficiency (Brooks, 2011).
Alternative innovation systems
Numerous proposals exist for alternative innovation systems for 
plant breeding and that may respond to some of the drawbacks of 
contemporary global IPR. Proposals range from those that modestly 
strengthen the public sector within the current regime to those that 
involve more fundamental dismantling of current IPPs for plant 
genetic resources. A few suggestions are outlined and discussed 
here.
Some authors have argued that IPPs, even with recommended 
improvements to their implementation, should be thought of as only 
one piece of a larger innovation system (Henry & Stiglitz, 2010). 
However, one might step back even further and question, as others 
have done, the value of emphasizing the idea of “innovation” itself 
(Russell & Vinsel, 2016; Van den Hove et al., 2012). In considering 
innovation to be the ends, we risk overshadowing the importance 
of maintenance and building work that is not considered inventive, 
and we also might lose sight of the actual ends that the innovation 
process is meant to achieve. Thus, we may even consider innovation 
to be one part of a larger germplasm management system, rather 
than the point of it, and increase the recognition of the importance 
of conservation and seed saving activities that might not be consid-
ered “innovative”.
Even within the “innovation” frame, Henry & Stiglitz (2010) 
advocate strengthening mechanisms to reduce the ex post inef-
ficiency created by the knowledge enclosures of dominant IPPs. 
For example, a liability approach, where anyone can access a 
given previous innovation for a fixed cost, and patents that are not 
“winner-take-all” could enable greater follow-on innovation. 
Incentivizing research with prizes for achieving specific goals, and 
increasing the amount of research provided through universities 
could similarly help keep outcomes of high-cost breeding research 
publicly available (Henry & Stiglitz, 2010). These authors also 
explore the complex factors that have motivated people to contrib-
ute to highly successful open source software projects, suggesting 
that a similar structure could be effective in other areas, such as 
plant breeding.
However, given the properties of plant germplasm; the possible 
advantages of a decentralized approach; and that it can be consid-
ered a “commons” in many ways (Luby & Goldman, 2016), one 
place to look for ideas on how to maintain or enhance it and its pub-
lic use is the voluminous work on common property resource (CPR) 
management. The diversity of existing and traditional approaches 
to governing breeding and plant genetic resources in fact bears 
some similarity to the diversity of formal and informal approaches 
to governing CPRs, which were notably examined by Ostrom 
(1990). With reference to sustainably managing CPRs, Ostrom 
noted that “the centralizers and the privatizers” often advocated 
oversimplified solutions based on idealized notions of their own 
effectiveness. The models justifying their authority (e.g., the 
“tragedy of the commons”) often relied on what Ostrom called 
“extreme assumptions”, which could not be properly applied to 
smaller-scale CPRs. In contrast, as the official website of the Nobel 
Prize summarized the work for which she was awarded a Nobel, 
“in many, but not all, cases, allowing users to develop their own 
rules to regulate the use of common property results in the most 
efficient solution for managing those resources” (Nobel Media AB, 
2014). Whether this general finding applies specifically to the seed/ 
germplasm commons is an open question. But its possible appli-
cability does, prima facie, further imply a shifting of the burden 
of proof onto those claiming overall benefits from global IPR.
To this point, one specific alternative approach to the dominant 
IPR has been developing in the form of the Open Source Seed 
Initiative (OSSI). OSSI has attempted to create the foundation for 
a robust, protected commons for plant genetic resources. As OSSI 
has pursued an approach focused on personal commitments made 
by the communities breeding and using OSSI-pledged materials, 
it has embraced a “moral economy” as opposed to a formal and 
definitively legally enforceable regime (CSA, 2014). OSSI is not 
currently attempting to coordinate with governments, and in this 
way the organization has perhaps had more freedom to directly 
contest the dominant IPR than those operating within that context. 
And while a “moral economy” approach may seem outdated from 
the perspective of the nearly-hegemonic Western-style global IPR, 
the literature on CPRs show that “informal” (i.e., non-state) institu-
tions can be a powerful tool for managing a commons. Thus OSSI’s 
approach has come to focus on the “OSSI Pledge”: an agreement 
that can be printed on seed packets wherein by opening the packet, 
the opener agrees to not restrict others’ use of the germplasm or its 
derivatives, and to reprint the agreement on seed packets of all future 
derivatives of the seeds as well (Open Source Seed Initiative, 2016). 
The protection of derivatives as unpatentable is a critical distinction 
between this approach and regulations, such as the ITPGR, that do 
not prevent such privatization and future enclosure of parts of the 
commons. The open source pledge also decentralizes the very act of 
participating in the protected commons (or opting out of intellectual 
property). Agreement and responsibility are relocated to the level of 
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individuals transferring the seed packet and enforcement through 
community norms and building relationships of trust.
Kloppenburg (2010) and CSA (2014) discuss the potential for open-
source approaches, like the OSSI pledge, to create more inclusive 
plant breeding communities, and also to democratize the use of 
the tools of plant breeding, such as genomic and transgenic tech-
niques. At the same time, given the concerns about OSSI expressed 
by some farmers and researchers involved in the food sovereignty 
and agroecology movements, as well as Native American commu-
nities (Breen, 2014), it is apparent that there is still work to be done 
to foster networks and relationships that fully serve all those who 
are managing biodiversity and agroecosystems, and that may truly 
serve as an alternative to global IPR.
It also may be possible for an open-source protected commons to 
coexist with IPP for germplasm, as some plant breeders participat-
ing in OSSI have considered releasing certain varieties through the 
open source system and protecting others under IP (Miller, 2014). 
However, a thorough exploration of the implications of having 
a dual commons-IP system is necessary to determine if it would 
actually be able to provide the potential benefits of both types of 
systems. At first glance, it seems that doing so would effectively 
create two separate breeding pools, which may be undesirable. It 
also seems that it would be difficult to allow patenting traits or 
specific sequences when such material may also exist in protected-
commons varieties, and there is the distinct possibility that breeders 
of certain high-quality materials may choose the dominant IPR over 
a protected commons. Thus, while it may be theoretically feasible 
for the two to co-exist, it may be that to be successful, a protected 
commons for plant genetic resources would eventually necessitate 
the end of the current system of IPPs. A significant possibility, and 
the one that we have tried to show that there is at least a prima facie 
argument for, is that this might not be a bad thing for innovation, or 
society in general.
Conclusions
At this point, many questions remain around what a more effective 
germplasm management system might look like. Some researchers 
have identified the need for future research to apply scenarios and 
modeling methods to the study of seed networks (Pautasso et al., 
2012). Perhaps these methods could also be used to project some of 
the outcomes of potential changes mentioned above, though as we 
have pointed out, at least some established economic models have 
already implied a more open-source/protected-commons IP system 
may actually help innovation.
That said, one lingering issue is whether any single IPR can effec-
tively support innovations across all contexts, particularly with 
across so-called “developed” and “developing” countries (Forsyth & 
Farran, 2013; Stiglitz, 2014). Similarly, there is room to debate 
how responsibilities for managing plant genetic resources might 
be organized with regard to various organizations and scales of 
government. As Merson (2000) has pointed out, tension may arise 
when efforts to offer protection for genetic resources in developing 
countries focus on implementing sovereignty over resources at the 
national level, while management of plant breeding and biodiver-
sity may actually be occurring on smaller community scales.
Although the food sovereignty movement is concerned with many 
different issues within contemporary agrifood systems, certain 
challenges to seed sovereignty could potentially be made moot if 
a protected commons approach to plant genetic resources were to 
be the norm. Yet even then, questions would remain with regards 
to how entities at various scales might bear and exercise respon-
sibilities to support plant breeding and conservation. Most likely, 
innovation systems that will be able to effectively support a more 
decentralized, diverse mix of approaches to developing localized 
plant varieties will need to be compatible with a wide range of gov-
ernance structures as well. In other words, different geographies, 
ecosystems, and histories may mean that plant genetic resources are 
best managed by different sizes and types of organizations from one 
community to the next, and which acknowledge the many different 
types of existing intellectual property relations and (still-evolving) 
traditions (Forsyth, 2016).
As global IPR is currently only becoming more entrenched, the 
most important step may not be to settle on which new approach 
might be best, but rather to call into question the appropriate-
ness of a global IPR for plant genetic materials. Given the anal-
ysis we have presented, the possibility that the dominant system 
may well be failing to live up to its purpose, and indeed may be 
mitigating against its supposedly desired effect, must be seriously 
considered.
The failings of this system should not surprise us, although the 
vast majority of those working within the pressures of this regime 
are likely doing their best to develop socially useful plant varieties 
within current norms. However, the logic of global IPR assumes 
that the viability of plant breeding depends first and foremost on its 
ability to generate profit; such an attitude may be sadly unsurpris-
ing to those familiar with the steady history of sublimating food 
security to other goals (McKeon, 2015). This observation in fact 
aligns with the pattern wherein societies that see plant breeding as 
a predominately economic and trade asset tend to implement IPPs, 
while those prioritizing breeding’s value to livelihoods and food 
security favor more open access systems (Forsyth & Farran, 2013). 
Or as Henry & Stiglitz (2010) have said, “the presumption that 
profit-maximizing behavior is socially optimal is not always right” 
(p. 238). However, OSSI Executive Director Claire Luby has asked, 
“In a globalized system where multinational companies are the 
major drivers, do societies still get a choice?” If it were to be agreed 
that alternatives should be more seriously pursued, it would also be 
incumbent on those who truly wish to support socially-beneficial 
innovation to agitate within their societies and to their governments 
to make sure such choices are possible—particularly those of us 
living in geopolitically powerful countries (like the U.S.) who have 
strongly influenced global IPR.
In part, what’s needed now is to reassess what is seen as success 
in a management system for plant breeding. For example, we may 
instead choose to focus on its ability to support a wide range of 
actors and activities for stable management of biodiversity on many 
scales. We may consider that a working plant breeding system 
will necessarily facilitate widespread access, exchange, and use of 
seeds, support decentralized efforts for local adaptation, and justly 
recognize the work of farmer-breeders today and over millennia. 
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Therefore we must begin instead from these goals, and then ask 
what regulations or structures might encourage the dedication of 
the resources that will be necessary to support them, rather than 
assuming the status quo is the best system. Although any large-scale 
transition towards alternatives poses serious challenges, this is true 
of any attempt to fulfil the grand challenges of sustainable, food 
secure, and resilient agrifood systems. As many in the movements 
for food sovereignty and agroecology have proposed, working to 
improve participation, autonomy, political agency, and especially 
power imbalances will be indispensable in any attempt to prioritize 
these values and foster a more just and sustainable world (Chappell 
et al., 2013; Farrell & Shalizi, 2015; Perfecto et al., 2009).
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Is the topic of the opinion article discussed accurately in the context of the current literature?
Yes
Are all factual statements correct and adequately supported by citations?
Yes
Are arguments sufficiently supported by evidence from the published literature?
Partly
Are the conclusions drawn balanced and justified on the basis of the presented arguments?
Yes
 No competing interests were disclosed.Competing Interests:
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 William F. Tracy
Department of Agronomy, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI, USA
This is an opinion article on issues surrounding intellectual property regimes. It is well written and easy to
read. As an opinion piece it cites previous publications and does not generate new data or knowledge.
The main thesis of the article is that intellectual property regimes in cultivated plants are "neither
necessary nor sufficient to generate socially beneficial improvements in crop plants and maintain
agrobiodiversity". The authors go further and dispute the benefits of IP in spurring innovation and greater
gains in plant improvement, a conclusion many would dispute. I am quite open to this argument and the
authors do a good job citing literature to support their position. The authors also discuss the negative
effects of IP on 'collaborative and cumulative plant breeding', a conclusion with which, I think, most
observers would agree. They also blame the use of IP for the decline of pubic plant breeding at
universities, NGOs, and International Centers. While IP may have a role in this decline, neoliberal
economic policies have been the main culprit. In fact we can locate the rise of  IPP in plant breeding on
those economic policies. Despite this quibble over the decline in public plant breeding, I tend to agree
with, or at least am open to, many of the authors arguments.  
My main concern with the article is that while they did an extensive literature review of papers that support
their point of view, the review of the extensive body of opposing literature is almost non-existent. The few
papers they mentioned are often from companies, which some readers might dismiss out of hand. Many
readers, especially those antagonistic to the authors' thesis, will dismiss the current article because it
does not address any of the numerous opposing publications and the data they include. I suggest the
authors start by reviewing Smith et al., 2016  and the literature contained therein. This is a review that
comes to a diametrically opposed conclusion from the current paper. It has an extensive citation list
supporting their conclusions. I will state here that I do not agree with many of the conclusions and
extrapolations in Smith et al.  but it and many other articles opposing the conclusions of the current piece
are out there and they need to addressed be the authors for this article to be taken seriously.
 
Finally, in the authors' promotion of open source proposals, they recognize the concerns of food and seed
sovereignty movements, but they do not address the chilling effect of the derivative clause on the
widespread use of germplasm developed with public funds. To justify public support of breeding
programs the germplasm needs to be made available as widely as possible with freedom to operate.
Many public and private breeders will not use open source material because of restrictions on ownership
of derivatives.
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Halpert and Chappell provide a knowledgeable, well-written overview of global intellectual property
protections and plant genetic resources and present a set of arguments for moving toward an alternative
open-source approach. As they point out in their introduction, the widespread assumption is that
monopoly patents on germplasm can pass a cost-benefit analysis test by creating paths for future
innovation. The authors question the truth of this assumption, however, and ask whether alternative
approaches such as the open-source framework also can support agricultural innovation while decreasing
the  inefficiency of the intellectual property regime.ex post 
 
 ThisIntellectual property protections for plants in the U.S. and in international agreements:
section describes the evolution of a global intellectual property regime, primarily following the utilitarian
approach of the United States and its development of plant patents, Plant Variety Protection (PVP)
certificates, and utility patents. The authors provide a brief, useful summary of each stage in this
development within U.S. law as well as the parallel international moves toward the International Union for
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) and the World Trade Organization’s requirements in the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). While alternatives have
been possible, the authors write, they have remained limited within the global intellectual property rights
regime.
 
 The authors ask whetherDraining the pool of knowledge: Enclosing more than giving back:
intellectual property protections in fact erect barriers against future innovation, contrary to the widespread
assumption, and thus decrease rather than augment our collective knowledge of agriculture and plant
breeding. Using both theoretical arguments and empirical examples, Halpert and Chappell describe the
way that plant patents promote the “anti-commons,” suppressing potentially valuable avenues of
research. They present evidence that raises significant doubts about the validity of claims that plant
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research. They present evidence that raises significant doubts about the validity of claims that plant
patents lead to more or better commercial varieties and conclude that intellectual property protections for
germplasm have not demonstrated their ability to promote needed innovation, much less net contributions
to collective knowledge.
 
This section provides furtherFurther considerations challenging contemporary dominant IPR: 
evidence that the global intellectual property regime may harm public goods, including biodiversity. The
authors point out that research on agricultural innovation so far has been unsatisfying and that farmers’
decision-making on varieties does not provide reliable evidence of seed performance. In contrast, the
seed industry has rapidly consolidated and is dominated by a small number of corporations.
 
 TheMassively parallel computing? Peasant seed innovations vs. high technology centralization:
authors compare the costs and benefits of centralized systems for plant breeding innovation in the global
intellectual property regime and decentralized selection as practiced by peasant farmers. Unlike the
centralized system, peasant farmers’  practices promote integration with local soil and climatein situ 
conditions and allow exposure to wild relatives and resulting increases in biodiversity. Drawing from
theories of Massively Parallel Computing and crowdsourcing, the authors suggest that decentralized
problem-solving is more efficient and can take both formal and informal approaches. In contract, the
centralized intellectual property regime is less able to recognize and respond to localized cultural and
social practices, is prone to power differences that stifle innovation, and may be at higher risk of
large-scale failure.
 
So far, the authors have challenged the belief that the globalAlternative innovation systems: 
intellectual property regime is necessary and efficient in terms of plant breeding innovation. In this section,
they lay out possible alternative systems, including revisions within the plant patent system, the use of
common property resource management, a protected commons envisioned by the Open Source Seed
Initiative, the establishment of a dual commons-intellectual property system, and – most radically – the
elimination of intellectual property protections for plant genetic resources. These alternatives are not
explored at length in this section, but the authors present a significant portfolio of possibilities that, in
various ways, question the foundational assumptions beneath the intellectual property system and call for
innovation in new directions.
 
 The final section brings the authors to two concluding questions: 1) Can a single,Conclusions:
centralized system of germplasm management encompass the wide range of traditions, practices, and
relationships surrounding plant genetic resources? 2) How do we define “success” in a plant breeding
management system? In other words, what are our goals? The authors suggest that multiple approaches
are more promising than a unified global system and that the goal of profit maximization is limited and,
when monopolistic, harmful.
 
Overall, this article follows well-recognized standards of argumentation and includes credible,
authoritative sources in its review of the literature. Two minor corrections are necessary, both in the
conclusion:
Page 8, left column, second and third line of final paragraph: either “with” or “across” needs
deletion;
Page 8, right column, third paragraph: Quotation from Claire Luby is not cited.
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